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NOTES AND COMMENT
anty Go. v. Cascade Construction Co.,' wherein it was said, referring
to the defense of ultra vires: "We would not be understood as abol-
ishing this defense. We would sustain it in any case where
the transaction is prohibited, illegal, or immoral. We merely wish to
be understood as following no Procrustean rule in such cases, but such
defense must always be considered on the merits in law and fact."
It is contended by some with considerable plausibility that the rule
in Washington as to the legal nature and enforceability of an ultra
vwres contract is technically inconsistent in that in some of the earlier
cases an ultra vires contract is held void, and at the same time it
is held that performance of the void contract by one party gives rise
to certain rights thereunder by way of estoppel. However, such rights
arise primarily not so much from the ultra vires contract as from the
performance thereof and the fact that under the circumstances, either
by reason of the benefits received therefrom by the other party or
otherwise, it is recognized as unjust to allow him to deny the validity
of the contract. Effect is given to the contract under such circum-
stances, not because it is valid, but because the defendant is not
legally permitted to set up such invalidity as a defense. A strict
adherence to the technical abstract rule that an ultra vires contract
is void per se (except as there is resort to recovery upon quasi contract)
frequently operates unfairly, dishonestly, and with manifest injustice.
It is submitted that this is a commendable instance of a departure, in
accordance with the modern tendency of the weight of authority among
the state courts, from a strict interpretation of an old technical theory,
in the direction of rendering the law a more effective instrumentality
for the administration of justice.
Elwood Hutcheson.
PROTECTING REAL ESTATE CONTRACT PURCHASES.-Many as-
signees of the vendors' interests in installment contracts for the sale of
real estate suppose that the recording of the assignment protects them
by giving constructive notice of their rights. The increasing amount
of investment in real estate contracts makes it important to determine
the best method for protecting the assignee.
Our Supreme Court' has said that recording "is purely a creation
of the statute", and since the recording of such assignments is not
provided for by statute it would seem that no constructive notice follows
from recording.
106 Wash. 478, 483, 180 Pac. 463 (1919).
"A contract entered into by a corporation is presumed to be within the cor-
porate powers unless the contrary appears, and the burden of proof is upon the
one who attacks the contract as ultra vtres." Belch v. Big Store Co., 46 Wash.
1, 5, 89 Pac. 174 (1907), citing I CLARK A.N MARSHCASL, PIVATE CORP., §174.
Ultra vtres is a defense not favored in law. U S. Fidelity L. Guaranty Co.
v. Cascade Construction Co., supra.
"Fischer v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 993 (1901).
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This conclusion is born out by two interesting Washington cases2
holding, in effect, that the assignment of a vendor's interest in a
chattel conditional sale contract does not give constructive notice of
the rights of the assignee.
Another analogy may be pointed out. It was formerly the law in
this state that the assignee of a real estate mortgagee's interest gained
no protection, as far as constructive notice is concerned, by recording
his assignment. The assignee's rights might be wiped out by an un-
authorized satisfaction by the original mortgagee,8 and this regardless
of the well known custom of recording such assignments. 4  Three years
after our Supreme Court had declared that the remedy for this "over-
sight of many years' standing" was with the Legislature, a law was
passed expressly providing for the recording of such assignments.8 The
effect of this change was, before lng, noted in the decisions.8
It has also been held in this State that the recording of an assign-
ment of a chose in action, such as a labor lien, does not give construc-
tive notice and that a right subsequently acquired by the debtor against
the assignor-creditor could be set up as against the assignee.7
It appearing, therefore, that the recording of an assignment of the
vendor's interest in a real estate contract gives no constructive notice,
we may point out several pitfalls existing for the unwary assignee.
2State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 340
(1918), and Bank of California v. Danamiller, 1,25 Wash. -55, 215 Pac. 321
(1993). The Supreme Court said the facts in these two cases were "completely
duplicated." In each case we may say that an owner sold a motor car under
conditional sale contract, thereupon assigning its interest to a bank. The pur-
chasers gave up their contracts and returned the cars to the vendors, who
wrongfully resold the cars to innocent purchasers. In each case the assignee
bank brought replevin against the innocent purchaser.
The cases reach different results. In the first case the court held that there
was a complete sale of the vendor's interest to the bank and that since no inter-
est remained in the vendor he could pass none on to the innocent purchaser.
The bank recovered. In the second case the facts showea that the assignment to
the bank was for security only, the bank not becoming a purchaser of the prop-
erty but receiving only the right to collect payments. The court held that title
remained in the vendor and that this was passed on to the innocent purchaser.
Nor was the bank protected as a pledgee, since there was lacking the delivery
of possession- requisite for the validity of a pledge. The bank was demed relief.
In the first case the court said, "It may well be argued that Johnson and
Dahl (innocent purchasers from the vendor) had no constructive notice under
the filing and recording provisions of our conditional sales contract statute,
Rem. Code, §§3670 and 3671, since that statute makes no provision for the
filing, recording or indexing of assignments of this nature."
'Howard v. Shaw, 10 Wash. 151, 156, 38 Pac. 746 (1894) is the leading case.
4 Howard v. Shaw, supra, where the court said, "We had no doubt that the
practice has long prevailed with the auditors in this state to record these instru-
ments and charge for it, as suggested by appellant, but we find no authority for
it in the statutes and the custom does not in this case make the law."
'Laws 1897, Ch. V p. 5, Ch. XXIII, p. 93.
'Seattle National Bank v. Ally, 66 Wash. 610, 190 Pac. 94 (1919).
'Dial v. Inland Logging Co., 59 Wash. 81, 100 Pac. 157 (1909). "We are
not aware of any statute and none has been called to our attention requiring or
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It is possible that: (1) The vendor might deed to the purchaser. If
the latter had not been notified of the assignment his payment to the
vendor would discharge him from further obligation. Even if he
had been notified, he might pass the title on to an innocent purchaser,
depriving the assignee of recourse against the property itself. (2)
The vendor might convey or mortgage the property, subject to the
contract, to some innocent party If, perchance, the contract had
not been recorded and there was no actual notice of it, the innocent
party would take free and dear. (3) If actual notice had not been
given the purchaser, a payment to the vendor would discharge the
purchaser pro tanto. (4) An attachment of the vendor's interest
in the land, or a judgment lien, might take precedence of-any right
of the assignee as against the land itself. This is debatable, how-
ever, in view of the holding in many states, that an assignment of
the purchase money debt impliedly carries the vendor's lien with it.8
(5) Particularly in case of the death of the vendor, the assignee,
upon default by the purchaser, would find difficulty in having the
contract forfeited.
We must consider not only the problem of protecting the assignee
during the pendency of the contract but also the question as to his
obligations when the contract is paid up. It seems that his rights
during the pendency of the contract would be safeguarded by giving
to the purchaser notice of the assignment and by taking from the
vendor a warranty deed running to the assignee, but subject to the
contract. This should be recorded in order to make secure the as-
signee's right to the property.
It has been recognized in this State that the rights and title of the
vendor may be conveyed 9 or mortgaged 0 without working a breach
authorizing the recording of the assignment of a lien of the character of the
one m this case. In the absence of such a statute the recording of the assign-
ment to the respondent before the assignment to the appellant did not operate
as constructive notice."
In this case a labor claimant assigned to the plaintiff his claim for $969.
He thereafter purported to assign this claim to the debtor, in consideration of a
payment of $375 by the debtor. The statement of the court that the assign-
ment of a claim by a creditor to his debtor is a settlement of the claim, wiping
out the rights of a prior assignee, is subject to criticism. While the debtor, not
knowing of the assignment, should have had a defense to the extent of the $375
paid, he should have derived no rights from the assignment per se, in view of
the holding in tis state that as between successive assignees of the same chose,
the assignee prior in time prevails. See Bellingham Bay Boom Co. v. Bribols,
14 Wash. 173, 181, 44 Pac. 153, 155 (1896), and Salem Trust Co. v. Manufac-
turers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 68 L. Ed. 628, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266, 31 A. L.
R. 867 (1923), citing the Washington case.
' Griffln v. Camack, 36 Ala. 695, 76 Am. Dec. 344 (1860), Perry v. Roberts,
30 Ind. 244, 95 Am. Dec. 689 (1868).
'Big Bend Land Co. v. Hutchings, 71 Wash. 345, 28 Pac. 652 (1912).
"Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 246, 138 Pac. 890 (1914), Shelton v.
Jones, 4 Wash. 692, 30 Pac. 1061 (1892).
1 Big Bend Land Co. v. Hut hngs, supra; Fargo v. Wade, 7 Ore. 477, 142
Pac. 830 (1914), Laughlin v. North Wisconsin, Lumber Co., 176 Fed. 772, 777(1910).
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of the contract with the purchaser."' The assignee or transferee will
receive the right to forfeit the contract upon default. 2
The question then arises as to the assignee's obligation when the
purchaser has paid up. Assuming that the assignee has taken from
the vendor and recorded a warranty deed subject to the contract, he
must then convey the title on to the purchaser, which he may do by
warranty deed. It has been held that the purchaser, in the case ot
the ordinary contract, cannot require a deed direct from the vendor,
it apparently being sufficient if the vendor's warranty is somewhere
in the chain of title, since the covenants run with the land and may
be enforced against all the covenantors."
It is apparent, however, that when the assignee conveys the prop-
erty to the purchaser in this manner he becomes liable on his warranty
It would seem possible for the assignee to avoid this liability and at
the same time fulfill the contract with the purchaser by placing in es-
crow a deed directly from the vendor to the purchaser and a special
warranty or quitclaim deed from himself to the purchaser. A clear
title and the warranty of the vendor would seem to be all that the
purchaser could require under the contract.' 4 Thus the assignee would
not be under the liability of a general warranty Nor could the
purchaser require him to make the title good, it having been held"
that, in the absence of express agreement, the assignee does not assume
'Boyd v. Bondy, 113 Wash. 38, 194 Pac. 393 (19,00) Lewis v. Bailey,
62 Wash. 296, 113 Pac. 761 (1911).
"Big Bend Land Co. v. Hutchings, supra. In Gottschalk v. Meisenheimer
62 Wash. 1299, 113 Pac. 765 (1911), a vendor agreed to "execute or cause to be
executed a warranty deed" to the purchaser. The land was held m the
name of a partner as trustee. It was held that the purchaser was entitled to
insist that the deed be executed by the vendor himself and that he need not
accept a title passed through another. Cf Herrwk Improvement Co. v. Kelly,
65 Wash. 16, 25, 117 Pac. 705 (1911). It was held in Big Bend Land Co. v.
Hutchings that the vendee is entitled to the kind of deed his contract calls for
and that the assignee must warrant to the extent of the consideration recited in
the contract.
" This would follow from the reasoning and decision in Big Bend Land Co.
v. Hutchings, supra, although the court said, "Here Garretson (vendor) con-
veyed by deed of general warranty to respondent (assignee) and it must con-
vey by deed of general warranty to appellant (purchaser)." See Note 15, infra.
"Bimrose v. Matthews, 78 Wash. 32, 138 Pac. 319 (1914). In this case the
vendors placed in escrow a warranty deed from themselves to the purchaser.
Later the vendors assigned the contract and gave the assignee a warranty deed
to the property. The assignee then executed to the purchaser a special war-
ranty deed and placed both deeds in escrow with the original contract and
deed. It developed that there were certain liens against the property and the
purchaser sued the assignee for specific performance of the contract. The suit
was held properly dismissed, the court saying, "There was no express promise
on the part of Matthews (assignee) to convey a perfect title. The title did not
pass through him. It passed directly from Starkey and wife (vendors) to
Bimrose (purchaser). All Matthews was required to do was to convey the title
he had. It seems plain to us that Matthews neither expressly nor impliedly
agreed to convey the title. As was said in Big Bend Land Co. v. Hut chings,
supra, the vendee is entitled to the deed that Ins contract calls for. His con-
tract m this case calls for a warranty deed from Starkey and wife, and that is
all the appellants are entitled to."
RECENT CASES
the liabilities of the vendor, although he acquired all the latter's "right,
title and interest"
If, as suggested, the vendor executes a deed to the purchaser and
also one to the assignee, it may be argued that these deeds are, if
executed and delivered at the same time, conflicting and nugatory;
or that, if the deed to the assignee is executed and delivered later, the
vendor has no title to pass. Where the deed to the purchaser is placed
in escrow, however, the legal title still remains in the grantor-6 until
the condition has been performed. The deed to the assignee conveys
only the vendor's interest, expressly subject to the contract. Upon
fulfillment of the contract, the right of the assignee, the holder of this
interest, is at an end.
In Bimrose v. Matthews, supra, it was stated that the title passed
directly from the vendor to the purchaser.' 7  If the vendor had al-
ready conveyed all his interest to the assignee, it is difficult to see
how this could be true. But whether the title passes directly or
through the assignee, the purchaser, in the absence of special provisions
in the contract, will have received all he is entitled to, the vendor
will not have given a general warranty and, in the meantime, will
have perfected his right to the purchase money by notifying the pur-
chaser of the assignment and will have acquired the vendor's title as
security by taking and recording the warranty deed from the vendor,
subject to the contract.
Robert B. Porterfield.
RECENT CASES
CoMMUNmITY PEOPERTY-SEPDATE PRoPEaTr OF TIE iVrEZ--CoMUNITY AND
SrPnxA~T Fuxns.-Plaintiff entered into negotiations for lot 5. The purchase
price was $4,000. $1,000 came from the plaintiff's separate funds and the bal-
ance was raised by the execution of a mortgage of $2,500 and five notes of $100
each signed by the community. Payments were made upon this mortgage until
about January, 1922, and with $1,600 still remaining unpaid a new mortgage was
executed by the community upon the property for the sum of $3,000, part of
wich was used to pay community debts. Held: The character of property is
to be determined as of the date of its acquisition, and unless such action is
taken thereafter as destroys its character it remains the same. Hence lot 5 is
one-fourth separate and three-fourths community. Zintheo 0. Goodnch Co., 36
Wash. Dec. 161, 239 Pac. 391 (19205).
11 In May v. E merson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 Pac. 451, 1065 (1908), it was held that
pending full payment of the price the legal title remained in the vendor and
was subject to the lien of a judgment against the vendor to the extent of Ins
interest therein.
T The court also said, "Tis deed was undoubtedly for the purpose of con-
veying the property to Matthews in case of the failure of Bimrose and wife to
comply with the contract and in case the contract should, for that reason, he
forfeited."
